What follows is highly naive and speculative: it will rest largely upon the opposition of linguistic knowledge to spatial and visual knowledge respectively.
I take it for granted that the latter are not necessarily connected, and so to establish that ~e need spatial knowledge to understand language (to name a task at random) does not establish that we need visual knowledge. The lack of necessary connexion is shown by such hackneyed examples as the person blind from birth, who has no visual, but a great deal of spatial, knowledge.
One initial reason for distinguishing the two is the great deal of argumentation in linguistics in recent years that falls under the general heading Iocalism. This thrust of argumentation has sought to establish the central role of spatial concepts in linguistics, and among its best known proponents are Anderson (1971) , Fillmore (1977) and Jackendoff (1975 have questioned the self-evidential truth of Iocalism, just in case anyone should think that, if it were true, it would support the centrality of visual knowledge in language understanding.
Let us now, as the brief substance of this paper, look at three arguments that might be put forward to support the dependence, or interdependence, of linguistic and visual knowledge.
Evolutionary ar~umants
This comes in phylogenetic and ontogenetlc forms. The former is the ingenious argument (Gregory 1970 ) that, since the human race has been able to see for many times more millenia than it has been able to speak or write, then it might seem reasonable to believe, on evolutionary grounds that the brain "took over" the existing visual structures for language understanding and production. This argument may well be true, but at present there is no independent evidence that would count for or against it.
The "ontogenetic form" of the argument -in the individual, that is -is that one first learns words essentially through the visual channel, and so again our linguistic knowledge is essentially dependent upon visual criteria and experience.
The best quick answer is to turn to the sort of word often used as a semantic primitive in AI language understanding systems: STUFF (=substance), ATRANS (=changing the ownership of an entity), CAUSE (=preceding and necessitating an event).
It is highly dubious that such very general concepts are, or can be, taught by visual/ ostensive methods. Can one point at substance as such? One may want, or mean, to, but can one in fact reliably do so?
One structure for many purposes This is a widespread view in AI that has been argued for explicitly by Hinsky (1975) and Rieger (1976) , among others. Roughly speaking, it is that implemented systems should use a single knowledge structure for a range of purposes:
language understanding, problem solving, etc.
It is an additional assumption that human beings do function in this way.
The thesis can be expressed at many levels, and at a sufficiently general level it is almost certainly true. But it might then mean no more than that a single programming language could express general sub-routlnes for parsing, noise reduction etc. for a number of input channels.
At a more specific level was the thesis, not now widely supported, that language and vision in some sense shared the same "grammar", in the sense of Chomsky's transformational grammar (Clowes 1972 Secondly, we may return to general semantic primitives of the sort already mentioned (and similar inventories may be found in (Bierwisch 1970 ) and (Leech 1974) ).
There are many possible ways in which one might seek to justify such primitives (see Wilks 1977) , and Bierwisch (1970) has gone on record as saying that they do denote, and are to that extent dependent upon visually observable entities. I suggested above that that may not be so: one may point at treacle, water or elephant meats but it is not so clear one can point at SUBSTANCE, yet this notion has a role to play in language understanding for how, without it, can one economically express such axioms as "A quantity of a substance plus a quantlt~of it yield a quantity 3 of it".
This axiom is not true of physical objects, as distinct from substances.
A well-known confusion must be avoided here:
it may well be true, as the model theoretic semanticists like Montague claim, that any contentful notion, primitive or not, refers to a function of sets.
In that sense move might be said to refer to a set of entities that move.
However, this point about logical reference has no consequences for the point about whether
or not such primitives denote entities in the real world.
Visual and spatial imagery
Finally, it is sometimes argued that the structures underlying language must depend upon those underlying vision if only because natural language is so full of visual imagery. In whatever sense "visual imagery" is taken, this fact is, I believe, irrelevant to any precise assertion under discussion, by which I mean any of I) Language understanding processes in humans depend, either as to primitive elements or structure, on visual experience and the mechanisms that interpret it.
II) The specification of language in humans has no significant overlap, in terms of primitive elements or structure, with that of other faculties, like vision.
III) Visual processes in humans depend, either as to elements or structure, on linguistic experience and the mechanisms that interpret and produce (sic) it.
For all three theses only anecdotal evidence is available, though I would be strengthened by empirical evidence that the blind from birth were less able to understand the use of~sual imagery in language. Those with a predellction for motor theories should be tempted to consider the Whorfian thesis III (Whorl, remember, believed we might perceive, say lightning, as an entity, rather than an activity or process because we denoted it by a member of the theoretical category NOUN, rather than VERB) since, as the structural difference of I and III makes clear, language is an activity in a way vision is not.
Thesis II will be agreeable to those who are impressed by the way in which confusion can arise when one tries to bring together information on the same topic, but obtained via different channels. As when one refers to two cities whose mutual relation of position one knows from a map; between which one can drive "without thinking"; and also about both of which one has a great deal of textual/factual information. Readers of (Fillmore 1977) 
